当地时间(jian)2023年9月8日，印度G20峰会召(zhao)开前夕，美国(guo)总(zong)统拜登与印度总(zong)理莫(mo)迪在新(xin)德里举行会晤。图(tu)自IC photo

新(xin)德里的外交(jiao)策略无疑看上去是非常聪明且成功的。但(dan)是，从更高的战略层面(mian)上，新(xin)德里的外交(jiao)能(neng)否算是成功的呢(ne)？显然(ran)，答案未必是那么清晰的。至少，新(xin)德里不仅失去了同中国(guo)和俄罗斯的传统友(you)谊(yi)和善意，另一方面(mian)却并没(mei)有收获来自美国(guo)及其庞大盟友(you)阵营的战略信任，成为(wei)了一个孤独的崛起大国(guo)。

在莫(mo)迪第(di)一任期内(nei)，中印尽管(guan)爆发了边境上的洞朗对峙，但(dan)是很快两国(guo)最高领导人就在武汉进(jin)行了非正式会晤，实现了两国(guo)关系(xi)的翻篇重启。然(ran)而，在莫(mo)迪第(di)二(er)任期初期，中印边境上爆发加(jia)勒万冲突后，两国(guo)并没(mei)有实现关系(xi)的转圜。

加(jia)勒万冲突的爆发，很明显是印度方面(mian)的错误(wu)导致的。莫(mo)迪在事件发生后很快就承认，“（中国(guo)）没(mei)有入侵入我(wo)们的边境，我(wo)们的哨所(suo)也没(mei)有被占领”。中方的反应很克制，直到(dao)10个月之后才公布中方军官和士兵的伤亡情况。

但(dan)中国(guo)的善意却没(mei)有换来印度的同等的克制和回报(bao)。3月，有报(bao)道称印度计划向边境增派军队，这违反了2020年9月中印两国(guo)防(fang)长会晤所(suo)达成的共(gong)识。新(xin)德里以(yi)边境边界(jie)问题作为(wei)杠(gang)杆，将中印关系(xi)维持在可控制的紧张状态上，以(yi)此作为(wei)拉(la)近同美国(guo)阵营的敲门砖。

在2022年9月上合组(zu)织撒(sa)马尔罕峰会、2022年11月巴厘岛G20峰会，以(yi)及2023年8月南非金砖峰会上，莫(mo)迪都有机会与习近平举行正式会晤并修复两国(guo)关系(xi)。但(dan)是，新(xin)德里却选择了另一条道路(lu)，这给中国(guo)释放的信号是——新(xin)德里已经在中美竞争的战略博弈中下注了美国(guo)。

印度与俄罗斯的传统友(you)谊(yi)同样受到(dao)了俄乌冲突的考验。俄乌冲突爆发后，虽(sui)然(ran)印度没(mei)有加(jia)入谴责俄罗斯的行列，但(dan)莫(mo)迪却中止了同普京的年度会晤。购买俄罗斯石油时，印度在议价上更是“落井下石”，极力压低(di)价格。

印度国(guo)防(fang)参谋长 阿尼尔·乔汉甚至公开评价道“俄罗斯的地缘政治影响力在未来会下降(jiang)，尽管(guan)它(ta)是一个核大国(guo)”这多少反映出印度对现状的评估，也让俄罗斯意识到(dao)，印度事实上押注俄罗斯会在俄乌冲突中“战败”。

与2014年印度对克里米亚问题的官方回应相比，印度此次的做法显然(ran)让俄国(guo)人感到(dao)失望。在俄罗斯看来，两国(guo)传统友(you)谊(yi)和信任因此受到(dao)了严重损害。

如此看来，中俄领导人都宣布不参加(jia)新(xin)德里的G20峰会，也是顺理成章的了。

与此同时，莫(mo)迪频繁受邀(yao)出现在了美西(xi)方主(zhu)导的多边舞台上，印度成为(wei)了美国(guo)重要的军事伙伴(ban)。但(dan)印度和美西(xi)方国(guo)家并不是铁板(ban)一块，加(jia)拿大指控印情报(bao)部(bu)门在加(jia)刺(ci)杀了一名锡克教人士。印度对此指控做出了强势回应，这遭到(dao)了美国(guo)和英国(guo)等国(guo)的批评。美国(guo)声称自己也挫败了一场涉嫌在纽约暗杀锡克教男子的阴谋，同时英国(guo)和澳大利(li)亚也对此感到(dao)紧张。拜登政府尽管(guan)“高高举起，轻轻放下”，但(dan)是在盎格鲁撒(sa)克逊国(guo)家看来，莫(mo)迪领导下的印度，本质上也是一个“异类”国(guo)家。

当地时间(jian)2023年6月22日，印度总(zong)理莫(mo)迪受邀(yao)在美国(guo)国(guo)会发表演讲(jiang)。图(tu)自IC photo

印度与日本的关系(xi)，在安倍晋三执政时期，确实发生了重要提升。但(dan)随(sui)着安倍晋三下台，日本领导人已经没(mei)有发展同印度关系(xi)的兴趣和热(re)情了。由日本承建(jian)的，从印度孟买到(dao)艾哈迈(mai)巴德的高铁项(xiang)目于2017年动工，但(dan)目前工程进(jin)度面(mian)临全面(mian)延期，预计于2026年才能(neng)投入运营。而日本与印度为(wei)了对抗中国(guo)的“一带一路(lu)”倡议而共(gong)同提出的“亚非增长走廊”倡议，迄今(jin)没(mei)有任何实际进(jin)展。

日本极力拉(la)印度加(jia)入RCEP以(yi)扩(kuo)展自身(shen)经济(ji)联盟并平衡中国(guo)的经济(ji)影响力，但(dan)是印度却最终退出了RCEP。而印度对日本企业在印投资激增的幻想也一再落空。 苏杰生在三月于东京举行的瑞辛纳圆桌会议上表示，“有很多欧美的商务代表团考察印度，但(dan)没(mei)有看到(dao)那么多来自日本的代表团。”

莫(mo)迪政府显然(ran)没(mei)有注意到(dao)美西(xi)方对印度崛起的整体性的战略焦虑，仍在不断宣扬印度的经济(ji)崛起的成就。印度幼稚的想法基于这样一种假设——美国(guo)及其盟友(you)要遏制中国(guo)经济(ji)发展，就会致力于帮助印度崛起。但(dan)如果说是美国(guo)提供的国(guo)际环境促成了中国(guo)崛起，那么美国(guo)有什么理由会再次犯(fan)下同样的“错误(wu)”呢(ne)？

总(zong)而言之，过去五年的莫(mo)迪外交(jiao)，以(yi)表面(mian)上的风光换来了印度在国(guo)家战略上的根本性伤害。中国(guo)有句古话，聪明反被聪明误(wu)。莫(mo)迪的外交(jiao)政策，显示出印度的精明，但(dan)是却可能(neng)埋(mai)下这个国(guo)家战略悲(bei)剧的祸根。

（本文英文版首发于《南华早报(bao)》，作者授权观察者网发布中文版。）

以(yi)下为(wei)文章英文版：

As India conducts the world’s biggest election, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) appear poised for victory. Modi’s popularity has been attributed to myriad factors, including the BJP’s adept mythologisation of the leader, India’s robust economic trajectory and Modi’s appeal to Hindu nationalism.

The performance of diplomacy is another factor. A flurry of visits from leaders of the United States, European countries, Japan and Australia, coupled with Modi’s attendance of G7 summits, have elevated India’s visibility, notably as the G20 summit host last year. The Modi administration’s diplomatic performance can be largely credited to the acumen of External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar, who has lavished praise on Modi’s strategic vision and been forthright in defending Indian policies, even while strategically aligning with the US-led bloc.

This tactical alliance has afforded India greater diplomatic agility and leverage amid the complex dynamics of its relationships with China, Russia and even the US, enabling it to capitalise on the competitive fractures among these global powers.

New Delhi’s diplomatic manoeuvres seem shrewd and efficacious but are they really? India’s camaraderie with China and Russia has been progressively strained, while the strategic trust of the US and its allies remains tenuous, with India increasingly being seen as an isolated ascending power.

After the 2017 Doklam stand-off, India and China swiftly restarted diplomatic relations at an informal summit in Wuhan. In stark contrast, relations after the 2020 Galwan Valley clash have yet to see a similar thaw.

The events leading to the Galwan Valley clash were predominantly a result of Indian missteps. As Modi said soon after the incident, China has not “intruded into our border, nor has any post been taken over by them”. China’s reaction was restrained, only revealing its casualty numbers many months later.

But China’s goodwill has not been reciprocated. In March, it was reported that India planned to move more troops to the border in contravention of the consensus reached in September 2020. India has since leveraged the border dispute to foster a controlled tension with China, using this as a door knocker to gravitate closer to the US-led alliance. There were many opportunities for Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping to repair relations face to face,including at the September 2022 Shanghai Cooperation

The long-standing India-Russia relationship has also been tested by the Ukraine conflict. Despite India’s refusal to condemn Russia, Modi has suspended his annual summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin and adopted a stern bargaining stance when buying Russian oil.

Last October, India’s Chief of Defence Staff Anil Chauhan said: “The geopolitical importance of Russia will go down in times to come. It is in spite of being a nuclear power.” This reflects India’s risk assessment and suggests it is wagering on Russia’s defeat in Ukraine.

Compared to India’s official response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, its approach this time has clearly disappointed Russia. In Russia’s view, the traditional friendship and trust between the two countries has been severely damaged.

Unsurprisingly, Russia’s interactions with India have largely ceased. Neither Putin nor Xi attended the G20 summit in New Delhi last year.

In the meantime, Modi has been invited to several forums dominated by the US and its allies, and has become an important defence partner of the US.

But India’s harsh response to Canada’s allegation of an assassination plot against a Sikh activist has been criticised by the US and Britain, among others. The US says it has foiled an alleged plot to assassinate a Sikh man in New York, and tensions have been felt in Britain and Australia. If nothing else, India is showing itself up as an ill fit for the Western alliance.

With Japan, relations with India saw a marked improvement during Shinzo Abe’s tenure. But with his departure, Japanese enthusiasm for deepening ties with India has waned. The Japan-backed high-speed rail project to connect Mumbai to Ahmedabad, launched in 2017, has faced delays and is now expected to be operational by 2026. The Asia-Africa Growth Corridor, a Japan-India collaboration announced in 2017 with hopes of rivalling China’s Belt and Road Initiative, has gone nowhere.

Japan had also vigorously encouraged India’s participation in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) as a means of diversifying economic alliances and counterbalancing China’s influence – only for India to dramatically back out at the last minute.

The hoped-for surge in Japanese business investment in India has also failed to materialise. At the Raisina Roundtable in Tokyo in March, Jaishankar said the growing Indian market has attracted many business delegations from Europe and the US “but I don’t see that many from Japan”.

The Modi administration, it seems, is overlooking any strategic anxieties that Japanese – and indeed, US and European – business communities may have over India’s rise. This may stem from an assumption that the West, intent on curbing China’s rise, will support India’s progress instead. But given that China’s rise was made possible by conditions in the international environment provided by the US, what are the chances Washington would make the same “mistake” with India?

Over the past few years, Modi’s diplomatic endeavours have prioritised quick gains over longer-term strategic advantages. India must beware of becoming a victim of its own cleverness. Modi’s diplomacy shows India’s strategic cunning – but also risks the making of a strategic misfortune for the country.

本文系(xi)观察者网独家稿件，文章内(nei)容纯属作者个人观点，不代表平台观点，未经授权，不得转载，否则将追究法律责任。关注观察者网微信guanchacn，每日阅读趣味文章。