当地时间2023年9月8日，印度G20峰会召开前(qian)夕，美国总统拜(bai)登与印度总理莫(mo)迪在新德里举行会晤。图(tu)自(zi)IC photo

新德里的(de)外交策略无(wu)疑看(kan)上(shang)去是非常聪明且成功的(de)。但是，从更高的(de)战略层面上(shang)，新德里的(de)外交能否算是成功的(de)呢？显然，答案未必是那么清(qing)晰的(de)。至少，新德里不仅失去了同中(zhong)国和俄罗斯的(de)传统友(you)谊(yi)和善意，另一方面却(que)并没有收获来(lai)自(zi)美国及其庞大盟(meng)友(you)阵营的(de)战略信(xin)任，成为了一个孤独的(de)崛起大国。

在莫(mo)迪第一任期内，中(zhong)印尽(jin)管爆发了边境上(shang)的(de)洞朗对峙，但是很快两国最高领(ling)导人就在武汉进(jin)行了非正式会晤，实现了两国关系(xi)的(de)翻篇重启(qi)。然而，在莫(mo)迪第二任期初期，中(zhong)印边境上(shang)爆发加勒(le)万冲突后，两国并没有实现关系(xi)的(de)转圜。

加勒(le)万冲突的(de)爆发，很明显是印度方面的(de)错误导致的(de)。莫(mo)迪在事件发生后很快就承认，“（中(zhong)国）没有入(ru)侵入(ru)我们的(de)边境，我们的(de)哨所也没有被占领(ling)”。中(zhong)方的(de)反应很克制，直到10个月之后才公布中(zhong)方军官和士兵的(de)伤亡情况。

但中(zhong)国的(de)善意却(que)没有换来(lai)印度的(de)同等的(de)克制和回报。3月，有报道称印度计(ji)划向(xiang)边境增派军队，这违反了2020年9月中(zhong)印两国防长会晤所达成的(de)共识。新德里以边境边界问题作为杠杆，将中(zhong)印关系(xi)维持在可控制的(de)紧(jin)张状(zhuang)态(tai)上(shang)，以此作为拉近同美国阵营的(de)敲(qiao)门(men)砖。

在2022年9月上(shang)合(he)组织撒马尔罕峰会、2022年11月巴厘岛G20峰会，以及2023年8月南非金砖峰会上(shang)，莫(mo)迪都有机会与习近平举行正式会晤并修复两国关系(xi)。但是，新德里却(que)选择了另一条道路(lu)，这给中(zhong)国释放的(de)信(xin)号是——新德里已经在中(zhong)美竞争的(de)战略博弈中(zhong)下注了美国。

印度与俄罗斯的(de)传统友(you)谊(yi)同样受到了俄乌(wu)冲突的(de)考验。俄乌(wu)冲突爆发后，虽然印度没有加入(ru)谴责(ze)俄罗斯的(de)行列，但莫(mo)迪却(que)中(zhong)止(zhi)了同普京的(de)年度会晤。购买俄罗斯石油时，印度在议(yi)价上(shang)更是“落井下石”，极力压低价格。

印度国防参谋长 阿(a)尼尔·乔汉甚至公开评价道“俄罗斯的(de)地缘政治影响力在未来(lai)会下降，尽(jin)管它是一个核大国”这多少反映出印度对现状(zhuang)的(de)评估，也让俄罗斯意识到，印度事实上(shang)押注俄罗斯会在俄乌(wu)冲突中(zhong)“战败”。

与2014年印度对克里米亚问题的(de)官方回应相比，印度此次的(de)做法显然让俄国人感(gan)到失望。在俄罗斯看(kan)来(lai)，两国传统友(you)谊(yi)和信(xin)任因此受到了严重损害。

如此看(kan)来(lai)，中(zhong)俄领(ling)导人都宣布不参加新德里的(de)G20峰会，也是顺理成章(zhang)的(de)了。

与此同时，莫(mo)迪频繁受邀出现在了美西方主(zhu)导的(de)多边舞台上(shang)，印度成为了美国重要的(de)军事伙(huo)伴。但印度和美西方国家并不是铁板一块，加拿大指控印情报部门(men)在加刺杀了一名锡克教人士。印度对此指控做出了强势回应，这遭到了美国和英国等国的(de)批评。美国声称自(zi)己也挫败了一场涉嫌在纽约暗杀锡克教男子的(de)阴谋，同时英国和澳(ao)大利亚也对此感(gan)到紧(jin)张。拜(bai)登政府尽(jin)管“高高举起，轻轻放下”，但是在盎格鲁(lu)撒克逊国家看(kan)来(lai)，莫(mo)迪领(ling)导下的(de)印度，本质上(shang)也是一个“异类”国家。

当地时间2023年6月22日，印度总理莫(mo)迪受邀在美国国会发表演(yan)讲。图(tu)自(zi)IC photo

印度与日本的(de)关系(xi)，在安倍晋三执政时期，确实发生了重要提升。但随着安倍晋三下台，日本领(ling)导人已经没有发展同印度关系(xi)的(de)兴趣和热(re)情了。由日本承建的(de)，从印度孟买到艾哈迈巴德的(de)高铁项目(mu)于2017年动工，但目(mu)前(qian)工程进(jin)度面临全面延期，预计(ji)于2026年才能投(tou)入(ru)运营。而日本与印度为了对抗中(zhong)国的(de)“一带一路(lu)”倡议(yi)而共同提出的(de)“亚非增长走(zou)廊”倡议(yi)，迄(qi)今(jin)没有任何实际进(jin)展。

日本极力拉印度加入(ru)RCEP以扩展自(zi)身经济联(lian)盟(meng)并平衡中(zhong)国的(de)经济影响力，但是印度却(que)最终退出了RCEP。而印度对日本企(qi)业在印投(tou)资激增的(de)幻想也一再落空。 苏杰生在三月于东京举行的(de)瑞辛纳圆(yuan)桌会议(yi)上(shang)表示(shi)，“有很多欧美的(de)商务代表团(tuan)考察印度，但没有看(kan)到那么多来(lai)自(zi)日本的(de)代表团(tuan)。”

莫(mo)迪政府显然没有注意到美西方对印度崛起的(de)整体性的(de)战略焦虑，仍在不断宣扬印度的(de)经济崛起的(de)成就。印度幼稚的(de)想法基于这样一种假设——美国及其盟(meng)友(you)要遏(e)制中(zhong)国经济发展，就会致力于帮助印度崛起。但如果说是美国提供的(de)国际环(huan)境促成了中(zhong)国崛起，那么美国有什么理由会再次犯下同样的(de)“错误”呢？

总而言之，过(guo)去五年的(de)莫(mo)迪外交，以表面上(shang)的(de)风(feng)光换来(lai)了印度在国家战略上(shang)的(de)根本性伤害。中(zhong)国有句古(gu)话，聪明反被聪明误。莫(mo)迪的(de)外交政策，显示(shi)出印度的(de)精明，但是却(que)可能埋(mai)下这个国家战略悲剧的(de)祸根。

（本文英文版首发于《南华早报》，作者授权观察者网发布中(zhong)文版。）

以下为文章(zhang)英文版：

As India conducts the world’s biggest election, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) appear poised for victory. Modi’s popularity has been attributed to myriad factors, including the BJP’s adept mythologisation of the leader, India’s robust economic trajectory and Modi’s appeal to Hindu nationalism.

The performance of diplomacy is another factor. A flurry of visits from leaders of the United States, European countries, Japan and Australia, coupled with Modi’s attendance of G7 summits, have elevated India’s visibility, notably as the G20 summit host last year. The Modi administration’s diplomatic performance can be largely credited to the acumen of External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar, who has lavished praise on Modi’s strategic vision and been forthright in defending Indian policies, even while strategically aligning with the US-led bloc.

This tactical alliance has afforded India greater diplomatic agility and leverage amid the complex dynamics of its relationships with China, Russia and even the US, enabling it to capitalise on the competitive fractures among these global powers.

New Delhi’s diplomatic manoeuvres seem shrewd and efficacious but are they really? India’s camaraderie with China and Russia has been progressively strained, while the strategic trust of the US and its allies remains tenuous, with India increasingly being seen as an isolated ascending power.

After the 2017 Doklam stand-off, India and China swiftly restarted diplomatic relations at an informal summit in Wuhan. In stark contrast, relations after the 2020 Galwan Valley clash have yet to see a similar thaw.

The events leading to the Galwan Valley clash were predominantly a result of Indian missteps. As Modi said soon after the incident, China has not “intruded into our border, nor has any post been taken over by them”. China’s reaction was restrained, only revealing its casualty numbers many months later.

But China’s goodwill has not been reciprocated. In March, it was reported that India planned to move more troops to the border in contravention of the consensus reached in September 2020. India has since leveraged the border dispute to foster a controlled tension with China, using this as a door knocker to gravitate closer to the US-led alliance. There were many opportunities for Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping to repair relations face to face,including at the September 2022 Shanghai Cooperation

The long-standing India-Russia relationship has also been tested by the Ukraine conflict. Despite India’s refusal to condemn Russia, Modi has suspended his annual summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin and adopted a stern bargaining stance when buying Russian oil.

Last October, India’s Chief of Defence Staff Anil Chauhan said: “The geopolitical importance of Russia will go down in times to come. It is in spite of being a nuclear power.” This reflects India’s risk assessment and suggests it is wagering on Russia’s defeat in Ukraine.

Compared to India’s official response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, its approach this time has clearly disappointed Russia. In Russia’s view, the traditional friendship and trust between the two countries has been severely damaged.

Unsurprisingly, Russia’s interactions with India have largely ceased. Neither Putin nor Xi attended the G20 summit in New Delhi last year.

In the meantime, Modi has been invited to several forums dominated by the US and its allies, and has become an important defence partner of the US.

But India’s harsh response to Canada’s allegation of an assassination plot against a Sikh activist has been criticised by the US and Britain, among others. The US says it has foiled an alleged plot to assassinate a Sikh man in New York, and tensions have been felt in Britain and Australia. If nothing else, India is showing itself up as an ill fit for the Western alliance.

With Japan, relations with India saw a marked improvement during Shinzo Abe’s tenure. But with his departure, Japanese enthusiasm for deepening ties with India has waned. The Japan-backed high-speed rail project to connect Mumbai to Ahmedabad, launched in 2017, has faced delays and is now expected to be operational by 2026. The Asia-Africa Growth Corridor, a Japan-India collaboration announced in 2017 with hopes of rivalling China’s Belt and Road Initiative, has gone nowhere.

Japan had also vigorously encouraged India’s participation in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) as a means of diversifying economic alliances and counterbalancing China’s influence – only for India to dramatically back out at the last minute.

The hoped-for surge in Japanese business investment in India has also failed to materialise. At the Raisina Roundtable in Tokyo in March, Jaishankar said the growing Indian market has attracted many business delegations from Europe and the US “but I don’t see that many from Japan”.

The Modi administration, it seems, is overlooking any strategic anxieties that Japanese – and indeed, US and European – business communities may have over India’s rise. This may stem from an assumption that the West, intent on curbing China’s rise, will support India’s progress instead. But given that China’s rise was made possible by conditions in the international environment provided by the US, what are the chances Washington would make the same “mistake” with India?

Over the past few years, Modi’s diplomatic endeavours have prioritised quick gains over longer-term strategic advantages. India must beware of becoming a victim of its own cleverness. Modi’s diplomacy shows India’s strategic cunning – but also risks the making of a strategic misfortune for the country.

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